Legal Ethics - Is There Anything New Under the
Sun? by Smith, N. Gregory
Annual Institute on Mineral Law
Volume 54 The 54th Annual Institute on Mineral Law Article 10
4-12-2007
Legal Ethics - Is There Anything New Under the
Sun?
N. Gregory Smith
Louisiana State University Law Center, greg.smith@law.lsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings
Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Mineral Law Institute at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Annual Institute on Mineral Law by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Smith, N. Gregory (2007) "Legal Ethics - Is There Anything New Under the Sun?," Annual Institute on Mineral Law: Vol. 54 , Article 10.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol54/iss1/10
6. Legal Ethics - Is There Anything New Under the
Sun?
N. Gregory Smith
G. Frank & Winston Purvis Professor ofLaw
LSU Law Center
1. Introduction
The answer to the question in the title is yes. The law of lawyering
is subject to rapid change. Change comes as the result of court orders,
court decisions, legislative enactments, and the work of bar associations
and their constituent groups. The most important changes, for most law-
yers, are those thz.t result from actions by the state supreme court. But
actions by other courts, and other groups, can also have significant im-
pact on the practice. Local law practice can also be affected by develop-
ments outside of the state. Among other things, local law practice can be
influenced by congressional enactments, by actions of the American Bar
Association, and by decisions of courts and ethics committees in other
jurisdictions.
II. News
A. Kickbacks
A Los Angeles grand jury indicted a New York law firm, and two of
its partners, alleging that, over a period of 20 years, it paid millions in
dollars in secret kickbacks to persons who served as plaintiffs in class
action lawsuits and shareholder derivative lawsuits involving major cor-
porations. The kickbacks were alleged to have helped the firm become
lead counsel in lucrative cases. The government claimed that the firm
received over $200 million in fees from class action suits and share-
holder derivative suits over the period.
The firm and :he partners issued a statement denying the allegations.
It also said that it had been in negotiations with the government for six
months to avoid an indictment of the entire firm for conduct which, even
if true, was unknown to 125 lawyers and 240 employees at the firm. The
firm also objected to the government's insistence that the firm waive the
attorney-client privilege as a condition of avoiding indictment.'
B. Malpractice Insurance
Idaho and Minnesota have now been added to the list of states that
require lawyers tc disclose whether they carry malpractice insurance.
The Idaho and Minnesota rules do not require that lawyers disclose this
I Tom Gilroy, Grand Jury Indicts Milberg Weiss in Alleged Plaintiff Kickback
Scheme, 22 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 264.
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information to clients or prospective clients, but the Minnesota rule pro-
vides for disclosure of the information to the public.
Nineteen states now appear to have some form of mandatory insur-
ance disclosure rule. Oregon is the only state that actually requires law-
yers to carry malpractice insurance.
C. Accidental Clients
A panel at the June 2006 Annual ABA National Conference on Pro-
fessional Responsibility considered the topic: "Tort Liability to Third
Parties: How Lawyers Can Be Liable for the Sins of the Clients."
One of the issues that came up dealt with so-called "accidental" or
"whoops" clients. These are clients that the lawyer did not intend to
have. In some cases, these clients can pursue disqualification motions or
bring malpractice actions. "Lawyers can get into big trouble when they
don't recognize who the client is," said one panelist. Sometimes is it not
easy to tell who the clients are. For example, the panel considered the
case of a lawyer being approached by an individual manager who wants
to start a corporation. He explains that there will be two other sharehold-
ers. The lawyer forms the corporation. Later, the manager tells the law-
yer that the corporation needs to be dissolved, and he, the manager, will
receive the sole asset of the corporation. To whom does the lawyer owe
duties in this situation?
One person who was present at the program looked at the issue an-
other way, and suggested that lawyers pay attention to who the client
isn't. The idea here is to confirm that you are not representing someone.
Do non-representation letters. It was suggested, as well, that reminders of
the representational role be included in correspondence along the way. "I
represent so and so, and you should get your own lawyer to review these
documents."
Another issue that came up in the discussion was that of disqualifi-
cation based on unsolicited receipt of confidential information from un-
solicited email communications. One of the problems here is getting a
bunch of confidential infornation from a new client before the lawyer
realizes that his or her law firm already represents the opponent. When
that happens, a disqualification motion might be in the offing. There are
some precautions that the lawyer can take under Rule 1.18.' But they
2 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, vol 22, No 17 (8-23-06), at
415.
Model Rule 1.18 provides:
(a) A person who discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming a client-
lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client.
(b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues. a lawyer who has had dis-
cussions with a prospective client shall not use or reveal information learned in the con-
sultation, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client.
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may be hard to implement in the email world. Some firms use disclaim-
ers that say that sending an email message to the website is not intended
to create a lawyer-client relationship, and that any information that is
forwarded will not be treated as confidential, but it's not clear if this will
work.
And even if it does, there is another problem. What if the lawyer
ends up taking on the new client, and, by the web site disclaimer, the
lawyer has already said that the information will not be treated as confi-
dential. Could that impair the attorney-client privilege?
D. Internet Issues
A conference on "blogs and the law" considered several issues re-
garding use of the internet in law practice. Among the thoughts presented
by panelists were the following: Rule 4.2, the "no contact" rule, applies
to internet contacts, just as it does to other types of contacts. The ease of
email communications should not cause lawyers to forget the rule. How-
ever, the lawyer needs to have knowledge that the person is represented
by counsel in the rr atter for the rule to apply.
Confidentiality is an issue, too. An attorney who engages in "blog-
ging" should not post client names or identifying information. Panelists
suggested that firms establish policies on blogging by their lawyers to
minimize the risks of releasing trade secrets and harassing co-workers.
"Flaming" clients or firm employees is something to be avoided.s
(c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests
materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related
matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be sig-
nificantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a
lawyer is disqualified fiom representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with
which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in
such a matter, except as provided in paragraph (d).
(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in para-
graph (c), representation is permissible if:
(1) both he affected client and the prospective client have given informed
consent, confirmel in writing, or:
(2) the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to
avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to
determine whether to represent the prospective client; and
(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(ii) written notice is promptly given to the prospective client.
4 The rule provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a pe son the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by
law or a court order.
5 Joyce E. Cutler, Flogging Seminar Speakers Detail Problems Firms and Lawyers
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E. Rock Paper Scissors
The attorneys in a Florida case were having problems agreeing on
discovery matters. The plaintiffs attorneys filed a motion with the fed-
eral district court to designate the location of a deposition. The court de-
nied the motion, but it fashioned what it called "a new form of alternative
dispute resolution." In particular:
[A]t 4:00 P.M. on Friday, June 30, 2006, counsel shall convene at a
neutral site agreeable to both parties. If counsel cannot agree on a
neutral site, they shall meet on the front steps of the Sam M. Gib-
bons U.S. Courthouse, 801 North Florida Ave., Tampa, Florida
33602. Each lawyer shall be entitled to be accompanied by one
paralegal who shall act as an attendant and witness. At that time and
location, counsel shall engage in one (1) game of "rock, paper, scis-
sors." The winner of this engagement shall be entitled to select the
location for the 30(b)(6) deposition to be held somewhere in Hills-
borough County during the period July 11-12, 2006. If either party
disputes the outcome of this engagement, an appeal may be filed
and a hearing will be held at 8:30 A.M. on Friday, July 7, 2006 be-
fore the undersigned.
June 6, 2006 order by Judge Gregory A. Presnell, United States District
Judge, Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, in Avista Manage-
ment, Inc. v. Wausau Underwriters Insurance Co.
III. Louisiana Rules and Court Orders
A. Trust Accounts & Overdraft Notification
Effective April 15, 2006, the Louisiana Supreme Court amended
Rule XIX, §28 to provide that lawyers who maintain trust accounts need
to execute an agreement with the bank that authorizes the bank to pro-
vide notice to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel of any overdraft on the
account. A copy of the agreement is to be forwarded to the ODC within
30 days of its execution. If the attorney has an existing account, it is to be
made subject to the overdraft notification procedure by November 1,
2006.
B. Advertising & Solicitation Rules
The Rules of Professional Conduct Committee of the Louisiana
State Bar Association has drafted some proposed amendments to the
Rules of Professional Conduct dealing with lawyer advertising and so-
licitation. They are still being considered by the Rules Committee and by
the Louisiana Supreme Court's Committee to Study Attorney Advertis-
ing.
Face When Using Internet, 22 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 219
(3 May 2006).
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The proposed rules include a new provision on "computer-accessed
communications." It sets forth some content requirements for lawyer iweb
sites. It also makes clear that email solicitations are subject to many of
the same restrictions that apply to in-person or telephone solicitations.
There is a provision that requires evaluation by the Rules of Professional
Conduct Committce of nearly all advertisements for compliance with the
rules governing lawyer advertising and solicitation. The proposed rules
also contemplate that optional advance written advisory opinions can be
obtained.
The draft rules include some exemptions from the advance evalua-
tion requirement for such things as brief public service announcements;
listings in law lists or bar publications; communications mailed to exist-
ing clients, former clients or other lawyers; written communications re-
quested by a prospective client; basic professional announcements re-
garding law firm changes that are mailed to other lawyers, relatives,
close friends, and existing or former clients.
Additional information can be obtained from the State Bar's web-
site. http://www.lshia.org/Quick-Links/NewsDetails.asp?NewslD= 110.
C. Fee Increase
As a result of an order of a March 2007 order of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court, the d'sciplinary fee that is assessed to lawyers will increase
by $35 in 2007-08, and by another $35 in 2009-10.
IV. Louisiana Cases
A. Permanent DisIharment - Short Subjects
In re Melton, 905 So. 2d 281 (La. 2005) (per curiam)
Attorney engaged in the unauthorized practice of law while sus-
pended from practice. While he was suspended, he appeared in court as a
counsel for a criminal defendant. He also failed to cooperate with the
ODC. One of the charges for which he had been suspended was practic-
ing law while ineligible to do so. The guidelines for permanent disbar-
ment include engaging in the unauthorized practice during a period of
suspension and engaging in serious misconduct that was preceded by
suspension. The court said that the attorney's offenses were "egregious"
and ordered permanent disbarment.
In re Dyer, 900 So. 2d 824 (La. 2005) (per curiam)
Lawyer permanently disbarred for engaging in unauthorized prac-
tice of law following interim suspension and disbarment and for convert-
ing settlement fund:; that he received on behalf of two clients.
In re Carter, 907 So. 2d 62 (La. 2005) (per curiam)
Attorney, who had already been disbarred for, among other things,
commingling and converting client funds, was found to have engaged in
six additional instar.ces of conversion of client funds, as well as failing to
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keep clients informed of the status of their cases, and negotiating settle-
ment checks without client knowledge or permission. He made tardy res-
titution to some clients, but still deprived those clients of their funds for
significant periods of time. The court said that the pattern of fraud and
theft over a period of several years "demonstrates with perfect clarity
that he lacks the fundamental moral fitness required of attorneys admit-
ted to the bar of this state." Id. at 68. The court ordered permanent dis-
barment.
In re Aubrey, 928 So. 2d 524 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Among other things, the attorney neglected legal matters, failed to
communicate with his clients, abandoned his law practice without notice
to clients, failed to cooperate with the ODC in many investigations, and
converted clients funds in excess of $120,000. He was permanently dis-
barred. The court said: "The intentional conversion of client funds, cou-
pled with respondent's abandonment of his law practice without notice to
his clients, indicates respondent lacks the requisite honesty and integrity
to practice law."
B. Other Louisiana Cases
1. Bar Admission
In re Vendt
924 So. 2d 89 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Vendt had been charged as a principal to second-degree murder. He later
pled guilty to three misdemeanor charges - simple battery, criminal mis-
chief, and aggravated assault - and was placed on probation. He reported
his misdemeanor convictions to the Committee on Bar Admissions when
he applied for the bar exam, which he successfully passed. Evidence was
taken on character and fitness issues. The ODC was also authorized to
conduct an investigation. The Supreme Court denied his application for
admission:
[P]etitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving that he has
"good moral character" to be admitted to the Louisiana State Bar
Association. ... The gravity of petitioner's conduct which resulted
in his criminal conviction compels this result.
Id. at 89-90.
2. More on Bar Admission
In re Schyberg
924 So. 2d 120 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Schyberg passed the bar exam, after getting permission from the
Supreme Court to take it. The Committee on Bar Admission had opposed
his application, based on concerns relating to his 1993 conviction for
possession of marijuana and his failure to disclose past criminal conduct
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when he applied to law school. The court appointed a commissioner to
take evidence and authorized the ODC to conduct an investigation.
Schyberg ackowledged at oral argument that he had not always
been truthful about his marijuana use. He also admitted that he had been
arrested for threatening his former wife, and that he had not disclosed
that when he applied for the bar exam. It also appeared that in connection
with his application to law school, he had misrepresented facts concern-
ing where he had attended college; he had failed to disclose that one of
hits undergraduate schools had placed him on academic probation; he had
failed to report that he had been arrested for contempt of court in 1989;
he had failed to disclose that he had violated his probation in 1993; and
he had not disclosed that he had been arrested for assault and battery in
1998.
He was not admitted.
3. Bar Admission, Yet Again
In re Kirkland
93 D So. 2d 939 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Kirkland was given permission to sit for the bar exam even though
the Committee on Bar Admissions opposed his application. He passed
the exam. Evidence was thereafter taken on whether he possessed the
character and fitnes to be admitted. At a hearing, Kirkland admitted that
he had been expelled from undergraduate university after drugs, alcohol,
and other contraband had been discovered in his on-campus apartment.
He also admitted that he had not disclosed this when he applied to law
school and that his omission was knowing and intentional. The supreme
court concluded that Kirkland "failed to meet his burden of proving that
he has 'good moral character' to be admitted to the Louisiana State Bar
Msociation." It denied his application for admission.
Cf., In re Rogers, 930 So. 2d 896 (La. 2006) (per curiam) (Bar ap-
plicant with history of substance abuse and a negative driving record,
was approved for conditional admission to the practice of law, subject to
a probationary period of five years).
4. Fraudulent [nsurance Scheme
In re Stoller
902 So. 2d 981 (La. 2005) (per curiam)
Attorney participated in a fraudulent insurance scheme. He posed as
counsel for fictitiot;s clients and negotiated two fraudulent settlement
checks. He opened a "client trust account" for the fraudulently-obtained
money and wrote checks from that account to himself or to his associate
in the scheme. The attorney was convicted of a federal criminal offense
of interstate transportation of a check arising out of the scheme. This
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amounted to misconduct." In the disciplinary case, the attorney said that
his medical condition should be regarded in mitigation. He claimed that
his Parkinson's disease, depression, and the effects of medication all af-
fected his judgement during the time of the misconduct.
The court said that the attorney's argument that his medical condi-
tion was responsible for the ethical lapses "might be tenable if his mis-
conduct consisted of an isolated act." Id. at 988. However, it didn't. The
court said that
a review of the record demonstrates that respondent's actions in-
volved a complex and interlocking series of actions which occurred
over a period of one year....
Respondent's repeated and deliberate actions over this lengthy pe-
riod of time belie his contention that his misconduct was an aberra-
tion. Indeed, respondent's own treating psychiatrist conceded that it
would be a "stretch" to attribute all of these actions to respondent's
medical condition. Considering the record as a whole, we must con-
clude there is no causal connection between respondent's miscon-
duct and his medical condition. As a result, respondent has failed to
prove that the mitigating factor of mental disability is applicable.
Id.
The attorney also argued that his medical condition should be con-
sidered as a "personal or emotional condition" that was entitled to some
mitigating effect. In this instance, according to the court
there is no requirement that there must be a causal nexus between
the misconduct and the personal or emotional problem in order for
the factor to be recognized in mitigation. Nonetheless, it would be
an exercise in absurdity if we were to hold that a medical condition
which does not satisfy the requirements to be considered in mitiga-
6 Louisiana Rule 8.4 provides:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly as-
sist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) Commit a criminal act especially one that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a !awyer in other respects;
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
(e) State or imply an ability to influence improperly a judge, judicial officer, gov-
ernmental agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct or other law;
(f) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of ap-
plicable Rules of Judicial Conduct or other law; or
(g) Threaten to present criminal or disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advar
tage in a civil matter.
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tion as a mental disability could be entitled to the same weight if
simply re-labeled as a personal and emotional problem. Thus, while
we accept respondent's medical condition as a personal or emotional
problem, we determine it carries very little weight in mitigation.
Id. at 988-99.
The court ordered permanent disbarment. Chief Justice Calogero
and Justice Weimer dissented. They favored disbarment. Justice Weimer
said that the majority was "correct to be wary" about excusing. ethical
lapses because of personal problems. However, he noted that the attorney
had had a "spotles:; record" for 27 years,.and he was "convinced that this
behavior, although inexcusable, is an aberration." Id. at 990.
5. Settlement Checks
Block v. Bernard, Cassisa, Elliott & Davis
927 So. 2d 339 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2005)
Attorney Block was retained by the Mannings to pursue personal
injury claims arising from a vehicular accident. The Mannings signed a
1/3 contingent fee agreement. Block delegated some work to Labat, an
associate he employed. Labat later left the firm. The Mannings wanted to
retain Labat, but were willing to allow Block to serve as co-counsel.
Block declined, and was discharged. He recorded his fee agreement to
create a lien on setilement proceeds.
The insurer, represented by the Bernard firm, agreed to settle for
$1.85 million. Block told counsel for the insurer that he should include
Block's name as a payee on the settlement check. Labat advised other-
wise, and the Mannings declined to have the check so written. Over
Block's protest, the check was written to Labat and the Mannings, who
agreed to indemnifi the insurer against any claims by Block.
It was later determined that Block was entitled to about $490,000 as
a fee. He sued the law firm, among others for his fee. He claimed, among
other things, that by omitting his name from the settlement check, the
Bernard firm had v:.olated the law.
Block's claim against the law firm was not successful. The court
said that normally a lawyer does not owe a duty to his client's adversary.
However, facts showing malice or an intent to harm could give rise to a
different result. But it said, on this point:
Even if the omission of Mr. Block's name as a payee on the settle-
ment check was deliberate, as all parties concede, that action cannot
rise to the status of an intentional tort absent a legal duty owed by
the defendant attorneys to avoid harm to Mr. Block, the breach of
that duty being the legal cause of damages, and the requisite mali-
cious intent on their part in the breach of the duty. We question
whether the conduct at issue can form the basis of an intentional
tort, as such a conclusion presupposes that the defendant'attorneys,
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rather than their client, had the power to make the ultimate decision
as how the check was drawn.
Id. at 345-46. The facts, said the court, were insufficient to show mali-
cious intent.
Block claimed that the firm owed him a duty under R.S. 37:218,
which provides for a lien in settlement proceeds if the fee contract is re-
corded.! The court said that "the practical effect" of the statute is to re-
quire that the attorney and his client be named as payees on settlement
checks. Moreover, the court took
judicial notice that the prevailing litigation practice among both the
insurance industry and the legal profession is to include as payees
on a settlement check the names of the client, the client's present
and former attorneys, and in some cases other third parties having
an interest in the funds.
Id. at 346-47.
However, the court also said that it could not conclude that the cus-
tom had acquired the force of law. The court acknowledged that the
situation was different with respect to health care providers, but that was
not the situation in this case.
The court also considered an argument that the Bernard firm owed a
duty under Rule 1.15 to turn funds over to a person who is entitled to
receive them.! However, the court said that the "defendant attorneys were
7 The statute provides:
A. By written contract signed by his client, an attorney at law may acquire as his
fee an interest in the subject matter of a suit, proposed suit, or claim in the assertion,
prosecution, or defense of which he is employed, whether the claim or suit be for money
or for property. Such interest shall be a special privilege to take rank as a first privilege
thereon, superior to all other privileges and security interests under Chapter 9 of the Lou-
isiana Commercial laws. In such contract, it may be stipulated that neither the attorney
nor the client may, without the written consent of the other, settle, compromise, release,
discontinue, or otherwise dispose of the suit or claim. Either party to the contract may, at
any time, file and record it with the clerk of court in the parish in which the suit is pend-
ing or is to be brought or with the clerk of court in the parish of the client's domicile.
After such filing, any settlement, compromise, discontinuance, or other disposition made
of the suit or claim by either the attorney or the client, without the written consent of the
other, is null and void and the suit or claim shall be proceeded with as if no such settle-
ment, compromise, discontinuance, or other disposition has been made.
B. The term "fee," as used in this Section, means the agreed upon fee, whether
fixed or contingent, and any and all other amounts advanced by the attorney to or on
behalf of the client, as permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Louisiana
State Bar Association.
8 Rule 1.15(d) provides:
(d) Upon receiving funds or other-property in which a client or third person has an
interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. For purposes of this
rule, the third person's interest shall be one of which the lawyer has actual knowledge,
and shall be limited to a statutory lien or privilege, a final judgment addressing disposi-
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never 'holders' of the check, and thus should not be considered as having
'received,' 'held,' or 'possessed' the funds represented by the check, for
purposes of Rule 1.15." Id. at 348.
But the court was not pleased about what had happened in this case.
It said:
The very fact that the present litigation is ongoing suggests that Mr.
Block's concerns regarding his ability to obtain his fee from the
funds held by Mr. Labat were legitimate, if not prescient.
By pursuing Sentry, Mr. Block will necessarily expose his former
clients to the indemnity claim asserted by Sentry. Should Sentry be
held liable fbr Mr. Block's fee, it may seek indemnity from either
Mr. Labat, the Mannings, or both. The Mannings, of course, could
have avoide this result by permitting Mr. Block to be included as a
payee on the settlement checks. For whatever reason, they chose not
to do so, to their potential peril. Of course, they may have recourse
against Mr. Labat, but such recourse may ultimately be of little
practical benefit to them should they encounter the same obstacles
Mr. Block did. The end result may be that the Mannings will ulti-
mately pay over $1,170,000.00 in attorney fees, in addition to litiga-
tion expenses, interest, and court costs, out of a total damages re-
covery of $1.960,000.00. Such a result, should it occur, would be a
sad commentary on both our legal profession and the present me-
chanics of the contingent fee system, and would cry out for the for-
mulation of a certain method of prevention of such situations in the
future, protecting all clients (both plaintiffs and defendants) from
unnecessary double fee payments.
Id. at 349.
6. Gifts
In re Cabibi
922 So. 2d 490 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Cabibi was a sole attorney in a firm. His daughter, Bird, was the
firm's sole employee. His practice focused on title work. Hirsch, a long-
time friend of the Cabibi family, contacted Bird and told her that she
would like to leave Cabibi a medical office building at her death. She
asked Bird to draft a codicil to this effect. Bird, who was a notary public,
did so, and mailed it to Hirsch. Hirsch executed an olographic codicil in
substantially the same form as the one prepared by Bird and delivered it
tion of those funds or y roperty, or a written agreement by the client or the lawyer on be-
half of the client guarar teeing payment out of those funds or property. Except as stated in
this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall
promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or
third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall
promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
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to the firm. Cabibi reviewed the codicil after it was delivered and told
Bird to put it in Hirsch's file.
When Hirsch died, Cabibi filed a petition to probate the codicil and
four wills. Those wills, which were executed in the 1980s when Cabibi's
father, a lawyer, was alive, left property to Cabibi's father or to Cabibi.
Hirsch's niece objected, claiming that Cabibi had violated Rule 1.8(c) by
preparing a codicil that gave himself a substantial gift.'
Cabibi said that he had not prepared the codicil because the codicil
that Hirsch executed was olographic. The court invalidated the codicil.
Cabibi did not appeal.
During the probate proceeding, Cabibi contacted the state bar,
which suggested he take the matter up with the ODC. When he did so,
the ODC filed formal charges against him. In the disciplinary hearing,
Bird testified that Cabibi's father had represented Hirsch but that Cabibi
himself had not done so. Cabibi testified as to the same. He also said that
he had not executed any influence over Hirsch with respect to the codicil,
and that when he first saw it, it had already been executed.
The Disciplinary Board recommended suspension, but the Supreme
Court decided not to impose formal discipline. It said that because
Cabibi's employee, his daughter, had prepared an instrument providing
for a substantial gift for Cabibi, "[o]bjectively, this constitutes a violation
of Rules 1.8(c) and 8.4(a)." But it also found that no harm had been
caused by the misconduct, which was unintentional and attributable to
the fact that Cabibi thought of Hirsch as a friend rather than as a client.
"In summary, given the long-standing, close personal relationship be-
tween the Cabibi and Hirsch families and the extremely limited interac-
tion between Mrs. Hirsch and respondent as an attorney, we decline to
impose formal discipline in the matter." 922 So. 2d at 497. Justice John-
son dissented.
7. Trust Account
In re Yonter
930 So. 2d 956 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Yonter deposited settlement funds into his trust account in which his
clients' former counsel claimed an interest. According to an agreement
that Yonter had entered into with the former counsel, the funds should
have been deposited with the court registry. But he did not deposit them
with the court for nearly a year, and only after being ordered to do so by
9 The rule provides:
A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a testamen-
tary gift, or prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person re-
lated to the lawyer any substantial gift unless the lawyer or other recipient of the gift, is
related to the client. For purposes of this paragraph, related persons include a spouse,
child, grandchild, parent, or grandparent.
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the trial court. During the tinie the funds were on deposit in the trust ac-
count, the trust account balance "frequently dropped below the amount in
question." The supreme court said that ths conduct fell below "the high
standard of care this court required of attorneys who have control over
funds belonging to others." There were mitigating circumstances, includ-
ing the absence of selfish motive, the attorney's belief that he was acting
in his clients' best interest (he claimed that "he was merely complying
with the directives of his clients, who had asserted that some of the attor-
ney's fees and c sts claimed by counsel . . . were not related to the set-
tled case."), and the fact that the Yonter had been ordered to pay attor-
ney's fees to the former counsel in connection with the court order to
deposit the funcs in the court registry. Nonetheless, Yonter was sus-
pended for a year and a day.
8. Termination of Representation
In re Turissini
927 So. 2d 1105 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Attorney disbarred for several violations, including failing to com-
municate with clients, failing to pursue matters she was retained to han-
dle, failing to cooperate with the ODC, and failing to return her client's
file, despite numerous requests to do so. The court cited 1.16(d) in con-
nection with the lawyer's obligations upon termination of representation.
That rule provides:
Upon termir ation of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reaso:aably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as
giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment
of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the cli-
ent is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense
that has not been earned or incurred. Upon written request by the
client, the lawyer shall promptly release to the client or the client's
new lawyer the entire file relating to the matter. The lawyer may re-
tain a copy of the file but shall not condition release over issues re-
lating to the expense of copying the file or for any other reason. The
responsibility for the cost of copying shall be determined in an ap-
propriate proceeding.
9. Inappropriate Arrest Warrant & Attorney Remorse
In re Downing
930 So. 2d 897 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
Downing represented Timothy Martin in a child custody matter. He
filed an ex parte motion for civil warrant, alleging that Debra Martin was
refusing to allow Timothy to exercise visitation rights. After securing the
warrant, Timothy went to Debra's home with two police officers to en-
force his visitation rights. However the children did not wish to go with
Timothy. Timothy falsely informed respondent that Debra had refused to
- 123 -
allow the children to go with him. Without verifying the assertion,
Downing filed an ex parte motion for Debra's arrest for failing to comply.;
with the warrant. Debra was subsequently arrested at the workplace. - --
Debra's attorney filed a complaint with the ODC. When Timothy
admitted that he may have been "mistaken" in asserting that Debra had,
refused to let the children go with him, Downing apologized to Debra's
attorney. In the disciplinary proceedings, Downing said that he had be-
lieved that Debra was an unrepresented party. He admitted that the com-
mon approach to dealing with a party's failure to comply with a visita-
tion order is to file a rule for contempt and hold a hearing, but he said
that this was the first time he had encountered a situation of refusal to
comply with an visitation order and, in the future, he would utilize rules
for contempt.
The supreme court concluded that Downing had acted incompe-
tently in filing the ex parte motions for civil warrant and arrest. It said:
The record as a whole suggests that respondent's actions were negli-
gent, resulting from his lack of understanding of the relevant proce-
dures in custody cases, and were not the result of any improper mo-
tive. Nonetheless, respondent's failure to research the law resulted in
the improper arrest of Debra and exposed Timothy to a lawsuit by
his ex-wife. We find that respondent's conduct violated Rule 1.1 (a)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct and was prejudicial to the ad-
ministration ofjustice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d).o"
With respect to sanctions, the court noted that the case involved
only a single count of misconduct. It ordered a fully-deferred three-
month suspension.
Justice Johnson and Justice Knoll dissented, on the view that an ac-
tual period of suspension was warranted. Justice Weimer concurred, but
wrote separately on the issue of remorse. He was concerned that the at-
torney's lack of remorse had been regarded as an aggravating factor in
earlier disciplinary proceedings, and said that a "lack of remorse should
not be applied whenever one offers an explanation or mounts a defense.
A lack of remorse should be applied to those who truly lack remorse in
the face of obvious wrongdoing." Id. at 906. However, concurring in the
result, he noted that the Supreme Court had not made a specific finding
that the attorney had exhibited a lack of remorse.
10. Fraud, Forgery, Misrepresentation, and Misstatement
In re Calahan
930 So. 2d 916 (La. 2006) (per curiam).
to 930 So. 2d at 904. Rule 1.1(a) states: "A lawyer shall provide competent represen-
tation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thorough-
ness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Rule 8.4 is quoted in
an earlier footnote.
-124-
* Attorney Calahan engaged in several acts of serious misconduct,
including the following: In one matter, the "Hebert" matter, he charged
his client a $12,300 legal fee to write a one-page demand letter. The de-
mand letter was directed to another lawyer who had charged the client an
excessive fee. It appeared that the $12,500 amount represented a contin-
gent fee that was in excess of 40% of the amount of the recovery. But
there was no written contingent fee agreement. Later, according to the
reported opinion, the attorney "conjured up a timesheet showing that he
worked on Mr. Hebert's case for 81 hours, which coincidentally was
enough time to justify the entirety of the $12,500 fee." The court de-
scribed this as a "fabrication." The court also said that his defense "bor-
dered on perjury." Id. at 937.
In the "Paylon" matter, the attorney filed a petition for divorce on
behalf of Ms. Payton, without allowing her to review it first. The petition
included false allegations of harassment and abuse, sexual and physical,
even though Ms. Payton had told him that she had not been harassed or
abused by her husband. He also forged Payton's signature on the affida-
vit verifying the truthfulness of the allegations in the petition. Based on
the false allegations, the trial court issued a restraining order against Ms.
Payton's husband. When Ms. Payton found out what the lawyer had
done, and inquired, he told her this was "standard wording in a restrain-
ing order" and that he had no idea how her signature had been forged.
After Payton filed a disciplinary complaint, the lawyer suggested that his
client was "emotionally disturbed," "dependent," and "in serious need of
professional courseling for her emotional stability." However, in re-
sponse to a direct question by the ODC about whether he had signed his
client's name on the affidavit did he reluctantly admit that he had done
so. He said he had done so as "a matter of convenience to the client and
to the court system." Id.
The "Temple" matter involved allegations by the lawyer, reported in
a New Iberia newspaper, that a Sergeant Colleen Temple.of the New
Iberia Police Department had a "special relationship" with a convicted
felon, that may have involved sexual intimacy. A few days later the law-
yer admitted that he had no proof of this. Temple sued for defamation,
and the trial court found that Calahan's statements were false and de-
famatory and mad,- with actual malice.
In the "Myrick" matter, he defrauded a blind woman into signing a
contingent fee agreement by assuring her that it was just a form "to let
me know that you came by." He then sent a letter to the insurance com-
pany stating that le had been retained to represent Ms. Myrick, and of-
fering to settle her claim for a fraction of what it was worth. Later, Ms.
Myrick learned that she had not signed a simple "registration form." She
also learned that the contingent fee agreement bore the signature of a
witness and a notary, neither of whom were present at the time she had
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met with the lawyer. Myrick fired the attorney. When the insurance
company sent a settlement check to Ms. Myrick, the lawyer told the in-
surance company that her boyfriend had stolen it and the she wanted to
put a stop payment on it. He told the adjuster to send the replacement
check to him. When the insurance company did so, he endorsed the
check with both his signature and that of Ms. Myrick. Eventually, a trial
court ordered the lawyer to return the money, and to pay an additional
$10,000 in damages and attorney's fees for his conduct, which the trial
court described as "nothing short of fraud."
Calahan was disbarred.
11. Bad Affidavits
In re Landry
934 So. 2d 694 (La. 2006) (per curiam)
In March 1997, Landry accepted a position as a title attorney with
Authentic Title, Ltd. In July of that year, he acted as a closing attorney
for a home refinance transaction for Walter Wallendorf. Because Wal-
ter's wife, Patsy, had died several months earlier, Landry determined that
it was necessary to open a succession. Walter told Landry that he and
Patsy had no children and no property other than the home and its fur-
nishings. Walter also told Landry that "there was no will" when Patsy
died. When Landry asked Walter for the names of witnesses who could
verify these facts, Walter told him that he and Patsy had not socialized
much and that he could not think of any.
Landry prepared an affidavit of death and heirship based on the in-
formation Walter had provided. The affidavit stated that Patsy had died
intestate. Walter signed the affidavit and respondent notarized it. A sec-
ond affidavit was executed by two secretaries employed by Authentic
Title. It repeated the information contained in Walter's affidavit. These
secretaries swore in the affidavit that they were "well acquainted" with
Patsy and they knew that she had died intestate. But they did not know
Patsy and did not know that she had died intestate. Landry reviewed the
affidavit and notarized it. The affidavits were included with a petition for
possession. In August 1997, the court rendered a judgment of possession
in favor of Walter.
In 1998, Landry learned that Patsy had died testate. She had exe-
cuted a will leaving all of her assets, including the home, to two children
of Shirley Walker. In subsequent litigation, the court set aside the earlier
judgment of possession in Walter's favor. The two Walker children later
filed a civil suit against Landry and others. The suit was settled for
$70,000.
In the ensuing disciplinary proceedings Landry admitted he had vio-
lated the Rules of Professional Conduct submitting affidavits in which
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the affiants declared personal knowledge of facts that they did not know.
On the issue of ,anctions, the court said, in part:
>.With regari to the affidavit of death and heirship executed by Wal-
ter, stating that Patsy died without leaving a will, we find respon-
dent's conduct was largely negligent. Although respondent probably
should hay:- undertaken a more detailed investigation to confirm the
correctness of Walter's statement that Patsy died intestate, there was
nothing in the statement to indicate it was false on its face.
The same cannot be said of the affidavit executed by respondent's
office staff It is undisputed that respondent knew his notarial secre-
taries were not "well acquainted" with Patsy, and that they had no
personal knowledge of whether she died intestate. The only logical
conclusion which can be drawn from respondent's actions is that he
knowingly and intentionally filed this false affidavit into the court
records. Respondent's actions caused actual harm to Walter and
Shirley's children. In addition, respondent's actions caused harm to
the court system, which must be able to rely on the truthfulness of
representations made by counsel.
The end result was a six-month suspension, all but 30 days of which was
deferred.
12. Advocate as Witness
Nicholas v. Nicholas
923 So. 2d 690 (La. App. I" Cir. 2005)
This was an action in which a former wife filed a motion for con-
tempt, claiming that her former husband had failed to pay court-ordered
spousal support. The court entered an order finding the former husband
in contempt. He: appealed. One of his claims on appeal was that the
counsel for his ormer wife acted as an advocate and a witness in the
same proceeding;, in violation of Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
The attorney for the former wife did, in fact, testify in the contempt
hearing. The tesi:imony related to the former husband's failure to make
spousal support payments to her client. The attorney testified because her
client was ill and not present on the day of the hearing.
At the time of the hearing, Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct provided:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer
is likely to be a necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal ser-
vices rendered in the case; or
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(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hard-
ship on the client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer
in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless pre-
cluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.
(c) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending
litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his
firm may be called as a witness other than on behalf of his client, he
may continue the representation until it is apparent that his testi-
mony is or may be prejudicial to his client.
In 2004, Rule 3.7 was amended to eliminate subsection c. With re-
spect to the application of the rule to this case, the Louisiana Supreme
Court said:
As this court has previously noted, this rule prohibits attorneys from
acting as advocates in trials in which they are likely to be called as
witnesses, but it does not prohibit attorneys from testifying at a trial
about facts essential to the case. . . . As in this case, in [a previous
case] the plaintiffs attorney was allowed to testify concerning non-
payment by the defendant when no other witness was available to
provide such testimony and the court found no violation of Rule 3.7.
In the case at hand, it was unforeseeable that [the former wife]
would become ill on the date of the hearing and be unable to testify
regarding [the former husband]'s continued failure to pay as court-
ordered. Moreover, the prior court orders directed [the former hus-
band] to make the payments to [the former wife]'s attorney, on her
behalf. [The former wife]'s attorney, therefore, had first-hand
knowledge about [the former husband]'s failure to abide by the
court's orders, and was the only other person besides [the former
wife] with that knowledge. Under these circumstances, it certainly
would have worked substantial hardship on [the former wife] to dis-
qualify her attorney from testifying to these essential facts regarding
[the former husband]'s noncompliance with the court's prior orders.
Id. at 695. Since the substantial hardship exception applied, the rule was
not violated.
V. Materials from Other Jurisdictions
1. Metadata
ABA Formal Op. 06-442
August 5, 2006
In this opinion, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility offered some advice about "metadata." This is in-
formation that is embedded in electronic documents. It is not immedi-
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ately visible; however, using the right software commands, this informa-
tion can be retieved.
The committee offered the following examples of metadata:
Metadata is ubiquitous in electronic documents. For example:
* Electronic documents routinely contain as embedded information
the last date and time that a document was saved, and data on when
it last was accessed. Anyone who has an electronic copy of such a
document usually can "right click" on it with a computer mouse (or
equivalent) to see that information.
* Many computer programs automatically embed in an electronic
document the name of the owner of the computer that created the
document, the date and time of its creation, and the name of the per-
son who last saved the document. Again, that information might
simply be a "right click" away.
* Some word processing programs allow users, when they review
and edit a document, to "redline" the changes they make in the
document to identify what they added and deleted. The redlined
changes might be readily visible, or they might be hidden, but even
in the lattcr case, they often will be revealed simply by clicking on a
software icon in the program.
* Some programs also allow users to embed comments in a docu-
ment. The comments may or may not be flagged in some manner,
and they rmay or may not "pop up" as a cursor is moved over their
locations.
The ethics committee noted that the Rules of Professional Conduct
contain no spec ific provision about the propriety of reviewing and using
metadata in documents prepared by others. It said:
The most :losely applicable rule, Rule 4.4(b), relates to a lawyer's
receipt of inadvertently sent information. Even if transmission of
"metadata' were to be regarded as inadvertent, Rule 4.4(b) is silent
as to the ethical propriety of a lawyer's review or use of such infor-
mation. The Rule provides only that "[a] lawyer who receives a
document relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and
knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadver-
tently sent shall promptly notify the sender." Comment [3] to Model
Rule 4.4 indicates that, unless other law requires otherwise, a lawyer
who receives an inadvertently sent document ordinarily may, but is
not required to, return it unread, as a matter of professional judg-
ment."
Model Rule 4.4(b) provides:
A lawyer wh> receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer's
client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent
shall promptly notify the sender.
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The committee did not characterize transmittal of metadata either as
inadvertent or as advertent, but it indicated that the resolution "may be
fact specific."
The committee noted that some authorities "have addressed ques-
tions related to a lawyer's search for, or use of, metadata under the rubric
of a lawyer's honesty, and have found such conduct ethically impermis-
sible." But the committee rejected that view, and stated that "the recent
addition of Rule 4.4(b) identifying the sole requirement of providing no-
tice to the sender of the receipt of inadvertently sent information, as evi-
dence of the intention to set no other specific restrictions on the receiving
lawyer's conduct found in other Rules. " And the committee said that the
question as to whether the receiving lawyer had an obligation to provide
notice of receipt of metadata to the sender was a subject that was outside
the scope of its opinion.
So the committee concluded that lawyers have no ethical duty to
refrain from reviewing and using metadata. It observed that attorneys
who are concerned about metadata can take steps to reduce risks, such as
avoiding the use of redlining programs, not including electronic com-
ments in earlier versions of documents, and sending hard copies or
scanned copies to opponents.
Louisiana 4.4(b), it should be noted, is broader than Model Rule
4.4(b). The Louisiana version states:
A lawyer who receives a writing that, on its face, appears to be sub-
ject to the attorney-client privilege or otherwise confidential, under
circumstances where it is clear that the writing was not intended for
the receiving lawyer, shall refrain from examining the writing,
promptly notify the sending lawyer, and return the writing.
Even so, it is not obvious that the presence of metadata in an otherwise
intentionally-sent document would engage the provisions of the rule.
2. More Metadata
Maryland State Bar Association Committee on Ethics
Opinion 2007-09 (10-19-06)
The Maryland ethics committee has also considered metadata is-
sues, this time, in the discovery context. It took the position that lawyers
who receive electronic discovery materials have no obligation to refrain
from viewing or using metadata or to notify the sender that they have
received it. But it said that the sending attorney generally has a duty to
take reasonable measures to avoid disclosure of confidential or work
product materials embedded in electronic discovery. It said that the duty
arose out of the Rules 1.1, on competence, and Rule 1.6, on confidential-
ity.
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The committee also noted that some issues regarding metadata
could be subject to recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure dealing with electronic discovery.
3. Death Wish
Virginiai State Bar Standing Committee on Legal Ethics
Opinion 1816 (2005)
A hypothetical question came to the Virginia ethics committee re-
garding how a lawyer should proceed when his or her troubled client
wishes to receive the death penalty. The question involved a hypothetical
client who had tried to commit suicide both before and after incarcera-
tion. According to the question, the client had been found competent to
stand trial. The client also claimed that he was not guilty of capital mur-
der, since his a.-tions were not intentional or premeditated. Nonetheless
he instructed hi; lawyer not to present evidence at the punishment phase
because he wanted to "commit suicide" through the imposition of the
death penalty.
The committee opined that the lawyer is not necessarily prohibited
from presenting evidence or taking other steps to protect the client, if the
lawyer believes that the client is not making an informed, rational, and
stable decision. Even though Rule 1.2 tells the lawyer to abide by the
client's decision regarding the objectives of the representation, and even
though that corcept seems to have been involved here, the committee
noted that Rule 1.14 also needed to be considered. This is a rule that al-
lows the lawyer to take appropriate actions if he or she believes that the
client cannot act in his or her best interests." This permits the lawyer to
do what is reasonably necessary in order to protect the client.
4. Federal Debt Collection Practices Act
Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg PLLC
443 F.3d 373 (4 h Cir. 2006)
12 Model Rule 1.14 provides:
(a) When a cl ent's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection
with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or
for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal
client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is
at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot
adequately act in-the, client's-own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary pro-
tective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to
take action to prote-t the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.
(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is
protected by Rule 1 6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the law-
yer is impliedly autiorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but
only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.
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Chase hired the Draper firm to act as trustee in foreclosing on a
deed of trust against debtor Wilson. Wilson sued the firm, claiming that
it had violated the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692
et seq. She claimed that the firm had failed to correctly verify the debt,
and had continued collection efforts after she had contested the debt. She
also claimed that the firm had communicated with her directly instead of
through her attorney.
The firm argued that it was not subject to the Act because, as a sub-
stitute trustee foreclosing on a deed of trust, it was not acting in connec-
tion with a debt and was not a debt collector, for purposes of the Act.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the law firm, concluding
that it could take advantage of an exception for fiduciaries whose debt
collection activities are incidental to their fiduciary obligations. How-
ever, the 4 Circuit reversed.
The court said that, under the Act, a "debt" is an obligation to pay
money arising out of a transaction. A mortgage liability would qualify,
thought the court. Indeed, the firm had referred to the obligation as a debt
when it had notified Wilson that she was in default.
The court noted that there was an exemption for debt collection ac-
tivity that is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation. However, the
court indicated that the trustee's actions in foreclosing on property were
not incidental to its fiduciary obligation. The court said that they were
"central to it."
The court also concluded that a separate exemption for those who
enforce security interests was not applicable. It said that exception ap-
plied when that was the person's only role in the debt collection process.
A dissenting judge said that the majority's decision reflected "a Shake-
spearean distrust of lawyers."
5. Press Release
Sealed Party v. Sealed Party
2006 WL 1207732 (S.D. Tex. 2006)
A client hired a Louisiana law firm to assist him with a dispute he
had with a company. The Louisiana firm referred the matter to a Texas
lawyer, Ajamie, who agreed to work on the case with an associate. Nego-
tiations failed, and the Texas lawyers sued. Later, the Texas firm dis-
solved. Ajamie joined one firm, but his partner and the associate who had
been working on the case went to another. The client decided to go with
the associate, who had been doing most of the work on the case.
A settlement was reached, and the client signed a confidentiality
provision agreeing not to disclose the terms. When Ajamie learned that
the matter had settled, he published a press release announcing it. The
press release mentioned that the client had valued Ajamie's long rela-
tionship with the company-opponent. Although the press release stated
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that the settlement terms were confidential, it said that the client was sat-
isfied with the resolution of the matter. Ajamie did not obtain the client's
permission to issue the press release.
The company-opponent sued the client and Ajamie for breaching
the settlement agreement. The claims against the client were dropped, but
not before the client incurred over $45,000 in legal fees.
The client brought a cross-claim against Ajamie, claiming breach of
fiduciary duty over the issuance of the press release, as well as a claim
for disgorgement of the $66,000 or so in fees that Ajamie had received
out of the settlement.
Ajamie claimed that he owned no duty to the client because the at-
torney-client relationship had ended before the press release was issued.
The court disagreed. It noted that Texas Rule 1.05(b)(1) prohibits a law-
yer from knowingly revealing confidential information about a client or a
former client without that person's permission.
Ajamie claimed that he had not revealed confidential information.
He said what he had revealed was part of the public record. The court
rejected this chim, stating that lawyers cannot disclose information to
outsiders just be cause it might be part of the public record. In any event,
the court noted that the client's opinions about the settlement were not
available to the public.
Nonetheless, the court said that the client had failed to prove any
actual monetary loss resulting from the lawyer's conduct. The client's
insurer and a corporation controlled by the client paid all but $1000 of
the legal bill. And the client had not complied with an order to specify
economic and noneconomic damages. The court did not order fee dis-
gorgement either, noting that forfeiture is proper only when there is a
clear and serious breach of fiduciary duty, or where the lawyer obtained
financial benefits from the breach. Here, the court did not regard the
breach as serious enough.
6. Microphones at Trial
Commonwealth v. Downey
842 N.E.2d 955 (Mass. Ct. App. 2006)
The Downey brothers were charged with murder. The trial was
filmed by the BEC, and portions of the trial, including a mid-trial discus-
sion between defense counsel and one of the defendants, was aired in the
U.S. on "Frontline." The discussion concerned whether the defendant
ought to plead guilty to a lesser-included offense.
After his conviction, one of the brothers moved for a new trial on
the ground that he had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel
because his lawyer had worn a body microphone throughout the trial and
had permitted the broadcast crew to listen to and record his conversations
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with his lawyer. He claimed that he did not learn about the microphone
until the second day of the trial.
After some related proceedings, the trial court eventually concluded
that neither of the brothers had knowingly and intelligently consented to
the hidden microphone arrangement. Their failure to object when they
did become aware of the microphones was not good enough for consent.
The court also determined that the lawyers had divided loyalties, and a
conflict of interest, because of their allegiance to the broadcasting com-
pany. This jeopardized the confidentiality of the attorneys' conversations
with their clients. It also caused the defendants not to be as forthright
with their lawyers as they might have been without the microphones. The
appellate court agreed, and said that the defendants were entitled to a
new trial.
7. No-Contact Rule
In re Haley
126 P.3d 1262 (Wash. 2006)
Haley, a Washington lawyer, sued the former chief executive officer
of a defunct corporation in which Haley had been a shareholder and di-
rector. After the trial, Haley represented himself in seeking to settle the
matter. On two occasions, he contacted the former CEO, even though he
was aware that the former CEO was represented by counsel. He was
charged with violating the "no-contact" rule, Rule 4.2."1
The Washington Supreme Court concluded that a lawyer, acting pro
se, violated Rule 4.2 if the lawyer contacted a represented party in con-
nection with the matter without th consent of that party's lawyer. It noted
that other jurisdictions have reached that conclusion, though still others
have taken the contrary view. However, the court said that it would apply
this interpretation only in future cases, so it declined to sanction Haley
for a violation of the rule.
One justice agreed with the decision not to sanction Haley for a
Rule 4.2 violation, but also expressed disagreement with the majority's
analysis. He noted that the language of the rule applied when a lawyer is
"representing a client." He said: "Lawyers cannot retain themselves any
more than pro se litigants can claim legal malpractice or ineffective as-
sistance of counsel." 126 P.3d at 1273. Two justices dissented. They
would have sanctioned Haley for the Rule 4.2 violation.
Cf District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Committee Opinion 331
(2005) (permissible for a lawyer to make direct contact with a party's in-
house lawyer even though the party was represented by outside counsel
in the matter).
8. Disparaging Statements About the Judge
13 The rule is quoted in footnote 4 supra.
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Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Commission
No. SC 17341
Attorney Notopoulos applied to be conservator of his mother's es-
tate and of "her person." Probate Judge Berman named Notopoulos con-
servator of the estate but appointed someone else to be conservator of her
person and yet another person to investigate her care and financial assets.
Notopoulos had some "dustups" with the judge over fees awarded to the
others and a dis agreement over a "do not resuscitate order."
After his mother died, Notopoulos wrote a letter to the probate court
staff that was highly critical of Berman. Among other things, it said that
he had engaged in "reckless interference" with the physician-patient rela-
tionship, that h.e had put the "financial greed of his cronies above my
mother's best interest." It also said that Berman was "not merely an em-
barrassment to :his community but a demonstrated financial predator of
its incapacitated and often dying elderly."
Berman filed a disciplinary complaint. The Supreme Court con-
cluded that Notpoulos had violated Rule 8.2,14 which, like its counter-
part in many other jurisdictions, makes it unethical for a lawyer to make
statements about the qualifications or integrity of judges with reckless
disregard for their truth. Notopoulos claimed that his statements were
protected by the First Amendment. He lost.
9. Disparagement II.
Grievance Administrator v. Fieger
719 N.W.2d 123 (Mich. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1257 (2007)
Attorney Geoffrey Fieger got into trouble for statements about some
Michigan appea s court judges after the court of appeals had overturned a
$15 million medical malpractice judgment in his client's favor.
According to the published opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court,
the appellate court overturned the award because there was insufficient
evidence to justify submission to the jury and because Fieger had en-
gaged in miscorduct during the case. The misconduct was said to have
included assertions, without any basis in fact, that defense witnesses had
destroyed, altered, or suppressed evidence; and an insinuation, "without
any basis in fact that one of the defendants had abandoned the plaintiffs
medical care to engage in a sexual tryst with a nurse."
Following the ruling of the court of appeals, Fieger took to the air
on his own radio program and addressed the appellate judges as follows:
14 Model Rule F.2(a) states: "A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer
knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the quali-
fications or integrity ofa judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candi-
date for election or appointment to judicial or legal office."
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"Hey Michael Talbot, and Bandstra, and Markey, I declare war on
you. You declare it on me, I declare it on you. Kiss my ass, too."
Mr. Fieger, referring to his client, then said, "He lost both his hands
and both his legs, but according to the Court of Appeals, he lost a
finger. Well, the finger he should keep is the one where he should
shove it up their asses."
Two days later, on the same radio show, Mr. Fieger called these
same judges "three jackass Court of Appeals judges." When another per-
son involved in the broadcast used the word "innuendo," Mr. Fieger
stated, "I know the only thing that's in their endo should be a large, you
know, plunger about the size of, you know, my fist." Finally, Mr. Fieger
said, "They say under their name, 'Court of Appeals Judge,' so anybody
that votes for them, they've changed their name from, you know, Adolf
Hitler and Goebbels, and I think - what was Hitler's - Eva Braun, I think
it was, is now Judge Markey, she's on the Court of Appeals. 719 N.W.2d
at 129.
Fieger was charged with misconduct. But he asserted some de-
fenses, including a defense that the rules under which he had been
charged were unconstitutional because they interfered with his First
Amendment rights. In particular, he claimed that the rules were unconsti-
tutionally vague. On that issue, the Michigan Supreme Court observed:
"If 'civility' and 'courtesy' rules can ever satisfy constitutional muster,
as we believe they can, it is beyond peradventure that the comments at
issue in this case clearly violated such rules." 719 N.W.2d at 139. Fieger
argued that he had been engaging in political speech. But the court said:
"To invite the sodomization of a judge, with a client's finger, a plunger,
or one's own fist, and to invite a judge to kiss one's ass can hardly be
considered an 'interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes."' 719 N.W.2d at 140. The court concluded that the
lawyer's coarse remarks warranted no First Amendment protection when
balanced against the state's compelling interest in maintaining public re-
spect for the integrity of the legal process.
The court concluded that Fieger should be reprimanded.
10. Murder and Bar Admission
In re Hamm
123 P.3d 652 (Arizona 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2300 (2006)
James Hamm served 17 years in prison after pleading guilty to the
first-degree murder of two men in a bank robbery. He was a model pris-
oner. He received a sociology degree through a prison education pro-
gram. While on parole, he graduated from Arizona State University's
College of Law. He passed the bar exam in 1999. In 2004 he filed a
character and fitness application. The character and fitness committee
recommended that the application be denied, and the Arizona Supreme
Court agreed.
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The court said that applicants to the bar have the burden of demon-
strating good mcral character. When there has been serious misconduct,
as here, the applicant has the burden of showing complete rehabilitation.
Referring to a New Jersey opinion, the court also said that "in the case of
extremely damning past misconduct, a showing of rehabilitation may be
virtually impossible to make." 123 P.3d at 658.
In this instance the court was concerned that Hamm had not fully
accepted responsibility for the two murders. It noted that Hamm had at-
tempted to distance himself from the murder committed by his accom-
plice and that he had insisted that the crime was merely a bungled rob-
bery. But the facts were that Hamm and his accomplice had armed them-
selves, drove the victims to a remote area, and executed them without
attempting a robbery. Hamm had shot one of the victims a second time in
order to ensure his death.
The court a.so noted Hamm's failures in making child support pay-
ments to his first wife and his failure to be forthright about that issue.
And it noted thai: he had failed to list on his application a public alterca-
tion with his second wife.
11. Truth in Negotiations
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Formal Opinion 06-439 (2006)
The Committee stated that a lawyer who negotiates on behalf of a
client does not violate the obligation of truthfulness by engaging in
"puffing," by exaggerating the client's negotiation goals, or by down-
playing the client's willingness to compromise. Such statements, said the
Committee, ordinarily are not considered "false statements of material
fact," under Model Rule 4.1 ." At the same time, said the Committee, the
lawyer must avoid affirmative misrepresentation. The Committee also
said that the staidard is the same when the lawyer is negotiating in a
"caucused mediation," in which a neutral third party meets privately with
each side. The Committee mentioned that Comment [2] to Model Rule
4.1 indicates that under generally accepted conventions in negotiation,
15 Model Rule 4 1 states: " In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person."
A comment to the rule states:
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should
be regarded a!, one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally ac-
cepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not
taken as staterients of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the sub-
ject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a
claim are ordinarily in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed prin-
cipal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. Lawyers
should be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to avoid criminal and
tortious misrepresentation.
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certain types of statements are not ordinarily considered statements of
fact. However, the Committee noted that it had in Formal Opinion 93-
370 (1993), advised that when a judge asks about the limits of a lawyer's
settlement authority in a civil matter, the lawyer must not lie about this
and should instead simply decline to answer. It also noted that in Formal
Opinion 94-387 (1994), it had said that a lawyer has no duty to inform
the other party that a statute of limitation has run on the client' s claim.
However, in Opinion 95-397 (1995), it said that a lawyer engaged in per-
sonal injury settlement negotiations must notify the opposing counsel
and the court if the client dies.
12. Bad Letter
In re Mertz
712 N.W.2d 849 (N.D. 2006) (per curiam)
Meagan Mertz, the daughter of attorney Monty Mertz, and her dogs
encountered Gary Hanson in a park. The dogs approached Hanson and
one of the dogs bit his leg. Hanson reported this to the police. The police
issued a press release, asking for help in identifying the dogs' owner to
determine if the dogs had received rabies vaccinations. Hanson also con-
tacted the local news media about the incident. Meagan Mertz contacted
the police and told them that she owned the dogs and they had received
rabies vaccinations. Hanson signed a complaint for a vicious-animal-at-
large infraction. A police officer also signed a second complaint for an
unlicensed-animal infraction.
Attorney Monty Mertz subsequently sent Hanson a letter informing
him that he was representing his daughter. The letter accused Hanson of
lying under oath when he signed the vicious-animal-at-large complaint
and included a draft of a defamation complaint that Mertz said he
planned to file against Hanson depending upon "how reasonable or un-
reasonable" Hanson chose to be.
Part of the letter stated:
You would never have been bitten by [Meagan's dog] had you not
attacked her. You must be either an animal hater or ignorant of ani-
mals, or both, to conduct yourself the way you did. The other issue
here is that my daughter was alone, on a dark, windy, rainy evening.
A reasonable argument can be made that you snuck up on her and
the dogs . . . . The unreasonable, ridiculous, angry, aggressive ac-
tions you took were very threatening to [Meagan's dog] and Meagan
.... In an atmosphere where Alfonso Rodriguez is facing the death
penalty for abducting a young woman just my daughter's age, one
should be very careful about sneaking up on a young woman in the
dark. If you do, you should be willing to accept the consequences.
712 N.W.2d at 854.
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The draft complaint said that Hanson had "intentionally and mali-
ciously made false and defamatory statements, orally and in writing,
about Meagan N. Mertz, stating falsely, among other things, that she
committed the pulic offense of owning a 'vicious dog,' which is defama-
tion per se." The communication also said: "If you wish to minimize the
consequences to you for your dishonesty, then you will agree to the dis-
missal of the charge you signed." Id. at 851.
The attorney's letter also offered Hanson a settlement. If Hanson
would dismiss the vicious dog claim, the attorney's daughter would ad-
mit to the unlicensed dog charge and pay any reasonable out of pocket
expenses Hanson incurred as a result of the bite.
Disciplinary proceedings commenced based on the attorney's com-
munication to Hanson.
The key issue before the North Dakota Supreme Court was whether
the communication violated Rule 4.4, which states "In representing a
client, a lawyer :;hall not use means that have no substantial purpose
other than to embarrass or burden a third person, or use methods of ob-
taining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person." A com-
ment to the rule states that "a lawyer shall not . .. act on a client's behalf
only to harass or maliciously injure another."
The attorney argued that there were many valid purposes for his let-
ter, including stopping Hanson from lying, stopping his daughter's suffer-
ing, and compromising the pending infraction and reimbursing Hanson's
medical expenses. The court agreed that these were all valid purposes for
the letter. But it also concluded that the portion of the letter calling Han-
son an animal hater and abuser and the statements suggesting Hanson
was sneaking up on Meagan Mertz in the dark do not support the sug-
gested valid purpases. They were inappropriate, said the court, and were
in violation of the rule. "[N]o substantial purpose existed for these state-
ments other than to embarrass or burden Hanson." Id. at 854.
The attorney was reprimanded and ordered to pay the costs and ex-
penses of the disciplinary proceeding.
13. Aggregate Settlement
American Bar Association Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Formal Op. 06-438 (2006)
The ABA ethics committee considered the duties of a lawyer who
was seeking to undertake a settlement involving multiple clients. Model
Rule 1.8(g), whichi concerns this issue, states:
A lawyer wl, o represents two or more clients shall not participate in
making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the cli-
ents, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or
nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in
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a writing signed by the client. The lawyer's disclosure shall include
the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of
the participation of each person in the settlement.
The rule is the same as Louisiana's except that Louisiana's version in-
cludes a sensible exception for court-approved class action settlements.
The ethics committee considered what the rule required the lawyer
to do, and said:
In seeking to obtain the informed consent of multiple clients to
make or accept an offer of an aggregate settlement or aggregated
agreement of their claims as required under Model Rule 1.8(g), a
lawyer must advise each client of the total amount or result of the
settlement or agreement, the amount and nature of every client's par-
ticipation in the settlement or agreement, the fees and costs to be
paid to the lawyer from the proceeds or by an opposing party or par-
ties, and the method by which the costs are to be apportioned to
each client.
14. Fraud in Real Estate Transaction
State v. Pacenza
136 P.3d 616 (Okla. 2006)
Attorney Pacenza sold some Oklahoma land to the Richards using a
contract for deed. He did not tell them that the land was subject to some
tax liens in the amount of $300,000 and that there was an incomplete
foreclosure proceeding against the property. When the title problems
came to light, the purchasers sued. Their lawyer also reported Pacenza to
disciplinary authorities. Mrs. Richards and her sister testified that they
asked Pacenza whether they needed independent legal representation.
They testified that he told them that the extra expense would be unneces-
sary as Pacenza was a "real estate attorney." Mrs. Richards stated that the
attorney had been asked whether the title was free and clear and that
Pacenza had responded affirmatively. Later, the attorney said that he
would remedy the title problems, but he did not.
In defense, the attorney claimed, among other things, that there had
been no attorney-client relationship between himself and the Richards
and that, despite the title defects, his contract for deed was sufficient to
transfer his interest to the Richards. He also said that a contract for deed
can be used when the conveyor of the property has no property interest
and claimed that he would have had a duty to clear the title only if the
Richards had presented him with cash in hand. The court referred to this
as "mental jockeying."
There was no attorney-client relationship between Pacenza and the
purchasers. But the court said that Pacenza's "actions surrounding the
contract for deed, his misrepresentations concerning the ability to clear
the title and his lack of any attempt to do so demonstrate a deliberate
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course of dishonest conduct reflecting adversely upon his fitness to prac-
tice law." He was suspended for two years and a day.
15. Sarbanes-Oxley
North Carolina State Bar Ethics Committee
Formal Opinion 2005-9 (2006)
The North Carolina ethics committee considered whether an attor-
ney representing a public company could disclose confidential informa-
tion about corporate misconduct to the SEC even if state ethics rules pro-
hibit such disclosure. The Committee said yes, in light of regulations au-
thorized by the SE.rbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
The Commiltee noted that Section 205.3(d)(2) of the SEC's rules
permit an attorney to make such a disclosure, in some circumstances, and
that the regulations preempt state rules to the contrary.
It should be noted that Rule 1.13 of Louisiana's Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct permit reporting outside the corporation in some circum-
stances." The relevant SEC rule provides:
(2) An attorney appearing and practicing before the Commission in
the representation of an issuer may reveal to the Commission, with-
out the issuer's consent, confidential information related to the rep-
resentation to the extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary:
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation
that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of the issuer or investors;
16 The Louisiana Rule provides, in pertinent part:
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a
matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organiza-
tion, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that
is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as
is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer rea-
sonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so,
the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if war-
ranted by the circumsances to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organi-
zation as determined by applicable law.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if
(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in
a timely and apfropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a viola-
tion of law, and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal informa-
tion relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure,
but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent
substantial injurt to the organization.
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(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or ad-
ministrative proceeding from committing perjury, proscribed in
18 U.S.C. 1621; suborning perjury, proscribed in 18 U.S.C.
1622; or committing any act proscribed in 18 U.S.C. 1001 that is
likely to perpetrate a fraud upon the Commission; or
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the is-
suer that caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of the issuer or investors in the furtherance of
which the attorney's services were used.
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2).
16. Billable Hours
In re Myers
127 P.3d 325 (Kan. 2006)
Attorney Myers gave some clients bad estate planning advice, en-
couraged them.to pursue an ill-conceived appeal, and billed his time in
one-hour increments, even when he spent less than an hour on the work.
He claimed that he did the rounding up only when he spent at least 45
minutes on a particular session.
A hearing panel found that he had violated Rule 1.5 (which prohib-
its unreasonable fees). His fees were unreasonable because of the round-
ing and because of the work on the appeal (because it was hopeless). The
Kansas Supreme Court agreed that Myers had violated Rule 1.5. It issued
a public censure.
17. Lunch & CLE Compliance
Kentucky Bar Association v. Nemes
198 S.W. 3d 600 (Ky. 2006)
October 25, 2005 was the last date a CLE program was offered that
would satisfy the Kentucky attorney Jason Nemes' need to comply with
CLE requirements within 12 months of his admission to the bar.
Nemes registered for and attended the first day of the program.
Howvever, on the second day, he came in late, about 30 minutes late, from
the lunch break. According to the Director for Continuing Legal Educa-
tion for the Kentucky Bar Association, this caused him to be out of com-
pliance with the applicable CLE requirements. The Kentucky Supreme
Court issued an order to show cause why Nemes should not be sus-
pended from the practice of law for noncompliance.
Nemes responded that, on the day that he had come late, he had
been asked to attend a luncheon by his employer, the Chief Justice of the
Kentucky Supreme Court. He had not anticipated that the luncheon
would run as late as it did. He said that the Chief Justice had asked him
to remain for the entire luncheon and for a short meeting afterwards.
Nemes apologized for the tardiness and requested that he be permitted to
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make up the miss ed time at the next regularly scheduled program. But
the state bar sought to suspend him from the practice of law, or, alterna-
tively, to have him ordered to make up the portion of the program he
missed at a 2006 New Lawyers Skills Program, pay a $500 fine for. his
noncompliance, and be ruled ineligible for claiming any hardship related
extensions of time for CLE compliance during 2006 and 2007.
The Kentucky Supreme Court did not order the suspension, and it
cut the fine to $300, but it ordered the other penalties that the state bar
sought.
18. Assaultirng Women While Intoxicated
Cklahoma Bar Association v. Garrett
127 P.3d 600 (Okla. 2005)
Attorney Garrett was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted of sexual
assault against two women. He also settled civil lawsuits, for $50,000
each, arising out of his conduct. Disciplinary proceedings followed.
The first assault took place at a sports bar. While there, he.motioned
for a 21-year old woman to come to his table. When she reached his ta-
ble, he placed his arm around her back, asked her name and indicated he
knew her parents. He moved his hand down and began rubbing her but-
tocks. With his other hand, he grabbed her breast. She stepped away
from him, but Gar-ett continued to make suggestive comments.
The second assault occurred a month later. While a woman was
leaving the restaurant where she worked, Garrett opened the door to the
foyer, walked over to her, pulled her towards him 'and grabbed her right
breast.
In the disciplinary case, Garrett said that he had been drinking heav-
ily on both occasions. Following his arrest, Garrett entered an inpatient
treatment facility where he remained for 72 days. Afterwards, he moved
to a new town to practice law. He stated, in the disciplinary proceedings,
that he did not think he was an alcoholic before the felony charges were
filed and that no one in the last twenty years told him he should quit
drinking.
The Oklahomia Supreme Court concluded that. the misconduct
stemmed from the alcohol abuse. It also concluded that Garrett had taken
significant steps to deal with his alcoholism. He had been cooperative,
remorseful, and apologetic. The court censured him and imposed a one-
year probation.
19. Exposure
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Linnen
857 N.E.2d 539 (Ohio 2006)
Attorney Stephen Linnen was indefinitely suspended for conduct
arising out of what was described as a "sexual. addiction." Over a period
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of 18 months, he stalked at least 38 female victims, exposed himself to
them, wearing nothing but shoes and a cap, and then took photographs of
their startled reactions.
He was eventually apprehended, sentenced to 18 months of work
release, fined, ordered to undergo counseling, and placed on probation.
In the disciplinary proceedings, he sought mitigation, based on his medi-
cally diagnosed sexual addiction. But disciplinary authorities noted that
the lawyer had been unwilling to get treatment for the disorder. And the
Ohio Supreme Court thought that he had sought the medical diagnosis to
raise it as a mitigating factor, not to stop himself from engaging in the
conduct. It also took a dim view of his professed regret for the behavior.
The court ordered indefinite suspension.
20. Virtual Law Firm
North Carolina State Bar Ethics Committee
Formal Opinion 2005-10 (2006)
The North Carolina ethics committee considered whether lawyers
could operate virtual law firms in which they market and provide legal
services over the Internet. The firm proposed to ask clients to sign a lim-
ited scope of representation agreement. The agreement would inform the
clients that the firm would not monitor the status of their cases and
would not enter an appearance on their behalf.
The Committee said that such arrangements were permissible, but it
identified some concerns. It noted that the Rules of Professional Conduct
do permit limited representation agreements, but they must be reasonable
and fully disclosed to the client.
The Committee cautioned that the lawyers would need to avoid vio-
lating advertising rules in other jurisdictions, avoid engaging in unau-
thorized practice of law in other jurisdictions, and to be careful to avoid
the creation of unintended lawyer-client relationships. Of course, the
lawyers would need to provide competent representation, and this would
require the lawyer to make the same inquiries, and provide the same
level of communication, that would be appropriate in a law office setting.
21. Law Group
Ohio Supreme Court Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline
Opinion 2006-2
The opinion of the Ohio ethics committee considered if it would be
appropriate for an Ohio lawyer to name his firm "The X Law Group"
when "X" is the lawyer's name and the lawyer employs two attorneys as
associates.
The committee noted that the lawyer could not use a name that was
misleading. There was nothing wrong with using the word "Group" in
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the name of the firm; however, it would need to be used accurately. It
would not do for the attorney to use that description if the attorney was a
sole practitioner and the only individuals working with him or her are
paralegals, other nonlawyers, office-sharing attorneys, or "of counsel"
lawyers.
22. Publicatio ri in "Federal Law Reports"
North Carolina State Bar v. Culbertson
627 S.E.2d 644 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)
The letterhead of attorney Culbertson described him as being "pub-
lished in Federal Reports, 3d Series." His Website said that he was "one
of the elite percentage of attorneys to be published in Federal Law Re-
ports - the large law books that contain the controlling caselaw of the
United States."
The North Carolina Bar charged him with violating Rule 7.1, which
prohibits lawyers from making false or misleading communications
about themselves or their services. The disciplinary commission pro-
posed an admonition. Culbertson objected, but the North Carolina Court
of Appeals agreed t6at an admonition was appropriate.
The court said that the claim about being published in the reporters
was misleading because Culbertson did not write any of the opinions in
the volumes. His slatement about belonging to an elite group was mis-
leading because admission to the court of appeals does not depend upon
one's ability. The a:torney claimed that his statements were protected by
the First Amendment. But the court said that misleading advertisements
cain be prohibited without violating the constitution.
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